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Article 4

NOTES
THE CVL RIGHTs

ACT oF 1871:

CONTINUING VrrALrY. -

The passage of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is recent history.' Certain of its provisions, particularly
the "public accommodations" section, 2 are currently being tested in the federal
courts.! The constitutionality of this great social experiment may soon be affirmed.
Whatever the merits of the Act might be, its legislative history and final passage
have been accompanied by an unprecedented degree of public consciousness. The
attendant publicity may even have drawn certain members of the legal profession
to the conclusion that the 1964 effort represents the only significant piece of Civil
Rights. legislation in existence. Others, more or less vaguely aware of pre-existing
Civil Rights legislation, may have incorrectly assumed that the new Act was designed
as a comprehensive replacement measure. To the extent that such impressions
exist, recent years of significant and effective implementation of the fourteenth
amendment and its concomitant guarantees of personal liberty are being overlooked.
The "public accommodations" section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents. a dramatically different approach to the problems of individual freedom
through its basic utilization of the commerce clause to bring the power of the
federal government to bear upon private persons. A strong foundation of legislative
guarantees against encroachment of individual rights by public officials, however,
has long been in existence, albeit only quite recently effective. This note will seek
to expose one of these remedies, explore its operation, and document its continued
vitality in the wake of the new Civil Rights Act. The discussion will primarily be
concerned with a single section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, currently designated as section 1983 of Title 42 U.S.C.4 Section 1983 is a broad fourteenth amendment-based provision which has assumed considerable importance in recent years.
It creates a civil action for damages and/or equitable relief against any person acting
"under color of' state law who deprives another person of the rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution or federal laws. The present treatment will
concern itself with the history, and more importantly, with the development of
section 1983 since the recent pivotal decision of Monroe v. Pape.5 It will conclude
with a brief discussion of the general relationship of section 1983 to the projected
scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, in particular, with a discussion of the
complementary character of these two measures.
Section 1983: Its Early History Through Monroe v. Pape
The five-year period immediately following the Civil War saw the proposal
and ratification of three amendments to the Constitution which were designed to
guarantee certain fundamental rights to the emancipated Negro. The thirteenth
amendment declared the abolition of slavery and other forms of involuntary servitude. Through a portion of the fourteenth amendment, the Negro was granted
his citizenship and guaranteed the equal enjoyment of the rights and privileges
possessed by other citizens. The fifteenth amendment assured the Negro that he
would not be denied the right to vote because of his race. All three of these
amendments contained clauses investing Congress with the power to pass legislation
in support of their terms. The immediate result was a series of five Civil Rights
1 78 Stat. 241 (1964). The Act was approved by the Senate on June 19, 1964, and by
the House of Representatives on July 2, 1964.
2 78 Stat. 241, § 201 (1964).
3 Katzenbach v. McClung, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2151 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 17, 1964), appeal
docketed, No. 543, Sept. 28, 1964; Heart of Atlanta Motel. Inc., 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2058 (N.D.
Ga. July 22, 1964), appeal docketed, No. 515, Sept. 21, 1964.
4 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
5 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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Acts, 6 passed between 1866 and 1875. Only one of these legislative efforts, section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was to achieve significant success in subsequent
years, and only then following a long dry spell of restrictive interpretation by the
s
Supreme Court.7 The Court, notably in United States v. Cruikshank and" the
6
Civil Rights Cases, substantially emasculated the broad purposes of the post-Civil
War amendments and legislation by holding that the amendments were directed
only against "state action," as opposed to action by private individuals. In fact,
in the Civil Rights Cases,'0 the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 which, but for its underlying constitutional basis, was quite
similar to the "public accommodations" section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11
The first section of the Act of 1871, currently section 1983, remained on the
books, however, having been spared by its reference to action taken "under color of"
state law. As presently constituted, section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 2in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.'

Although some deviation from a strict interpretation of section 1983 may have
taken place during the first few decades of the present century, no singularly noteworthy interpretation of the provision manifested itself until Hague v. CIO' s was
decided in 1939. In that case, the plaintiffs, members of a labor union,. sought
an injunction against certain Jersey City, New Jersey municipal officials to restrain them from interfering with a claimed right to free speech and peaceful
assembly. The municipal officials had refused to grant the union permission to
conduct a campaign publicizing the National Labor Relations Act. Although his
was not the opinion of the Court, Justice Stone set the mood for the years to come
by asserting that the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly were rights
secured against state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and made actionable by section 1983.14 Two other crucial decisions were handed
down shortly after the decision in Hague. In United States v. Classic'5 and Screws
v. United States,16 both of which involved the interpretation of the criminal
counterpart of section 1983,17 the Supreme Court held that "misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law"
within the meaning of the statute.' s
6 14 Stat. 27 (1866); 16 Stat. 140 (1870); 16 Stat. 433 (1871); 17 Stat. 13 (1871);
18 Stat. 335 (1875).
7 See generally, Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mxcr.
L. Rv.1323 (1952).
8 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
9 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10 Ibid.
11 Section 1 of the Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, read in part: "[AII persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement.... ." Section 201 (a) of the Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
241, reads in part: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation. .. ."

12 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952).
13 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
14 Id. at 527. Hague v. CIO was a 5-2 decision, presenting three separate opinions for
the majority and one dissenting opinion. Three members of the majority felt that free speech
and peaceful assembly were "privileges" of citizens of the United States.
15 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
16 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
17 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948).
18 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Screws v.United States, 325 U.S.
91, 109 (1945).
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The decisions in the Hague, Classic and Screws cases undoubtedly began a
period of greater acceptance of section 1983 in the lower federal courts. This
receptivity is evidenced by the scores of claims appearing in the federal courts
during the 1950's. The most significant and authoritative treatment of this section
by the Supreme Court, however, did not occur until 1961 in the landmark decision
9
of Monroe v. Pape.1
In Monroe the plaintiffs, a Negro family, alleged that a squad of Chicago
policemen, investigating a two-day-old murder, broke into their home at an early
hour, awakened them, and forced them to stand naked in the living room while
ransacking the house. Their complaint further alleged that Mr. Monroe was taken
to police headquarters and interrogated for about ten hours while being held incommunicado. It specified that he was neither taken before a magistrate nor permitted to call an attorney, and that he was eventually released without criminal
charges being filed. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that although the officers had
procured neither a search warrant nor an arrest warrant, they had nevertheless
acted "under the color of" the laws of Illinois and the City of Chicago in depriving
them of their "rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution." The
action for damages under section 1983 was brought in the district court against
the City of Chicago and the police officers. The district court granted a motion to
dismiss made by all the defendants on the ground that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.2 0 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed as to the City of Chicago, asserting that municipalities
were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.21 It reversed as to the police,
however, on the ground that a cause of action was stated under section 1983 when
the officers,2 2 even though the
the plaintiffs alleged a denial of due process 2by
3
latter may have acted in violation of state law.
In addition, the Supreme Court made at least two other significant pronouncements with respect to the interpretation of section 1983. It declared that the
remedy afforded by section 1983 is supplementary to any relief available in the
state courts, 2 4 and that it is not necessary for relief under section 1983 that the
the specific intention of depriving the plaintiff of some
defendants have acted with
25
constitutional guarantee.
The lasting importance of the decision may not rest upon any of the grounds
just stated. Monroe did much more than sound a note of encouragement for
victims of conduct theretofore only apparently proscribed by the language of section
1983. The point is not that it was departing radically from prior interpretations of
the provision, for as will be seen, several of its conclusions were anticipated by
lower court opinions. Rather, the Supreme Court in Monroe exhibited a sweeping
change in the judicial attitude toward the reading of complaints under section 1983.
As a result of Monroe, public officials must at least respond affirmatively to allegations of abuses amounting to constitutional deprivations. Dispositions of these claims
will take place at the hearing or trial stage, rather than on the paper pleadings,
as was so often the case before Monroe. Thus, the progress which section 1983
had been making since Hague v. C10 2 6 was judicially approved.
Section 1983: Jurisdictional and Procedural Problems
Section 1983 does not of itself confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to
entertain suits for deprivations of constitutional rights. It merely creates the claim
19
20
21
22
23

365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.

25
26

Id. at 187.
307 U.S. 496 (1939).

24 Id. at 183.
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or cause of action. The requisite jurisdiction is established by a statute whose wording is nearly identical. 28 U.S.C. §1343, in its relevant part, provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: ....
(3) to redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providIng for equal rights
27 of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States.
The slight variations in statutory language from that of section 1983 have posed

no real difficulties. 28 In fact, many federal courts have apparently based their
jurisdiction on section 1983 itself.29 It should be noted that section 1343(3) contains no requirement of jurisdictional amount, and it is well settled that a claimant
need not make any allegation respecting the amount in controversy.30 This conclusion is almost inescapable, since
the nature of the interests sought to be pro31
tected defies monetary valuation.
Congress also failed to provide a statute of limitations applicable to section
1983 claims. There is no longer any question that in these circumstances, while
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the tolling of whatever statute is

applicable,3 2 the forum state provides the statute limiting the period within which
the action may be brought.3 3 Since, of course, none of the states have statutes
specifically limiting claims for constitutional deprivations, holdings involving statute

of limitations questions often resolve themselves into disputes as to which of the

various limiting statutes of a state is "most applicable."3 4 On this point irreconcilable
conflict exists, partly due to the almost infinite variety of state statutes of limitation,
and partly due to frequent attempts to conceptualize the nature of the claim which
has been asserted. Some courts, for example, have taken the position that since the
cause of action did not exist at common law and would not exist but for a federal
statute, the applicable period of limitations is defined by the state provision governing actions involving a "liability created by statute."3 5 Other courts have looked

upon certain section 1983 claims as involving a demand for relief from injury
suffered as a result of tortious conduct, and have applied the state statutes of

limitation accordingly. It has been held, for example, that a claim alleging a denial
of due process stemming from police brutality should be governed by the statute
limiting actions for "wrongful injury" or assault and battery.36 Still other courts
have solved the limitation of actions problem by lumping section 1983 claims in
the catch-all category of "actions not otherwise provided for."37 No criticism can
27 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958).'
28 But see Comment, 49 CALIF. L. Rav. 145, 147-51 (1961).
29 E.g., Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Pritchard v. Downie, 216 F.
Supp. 621 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964).
30 E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161 (1942) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 531 (1939) (concurring opinion); Adams v. City of Park Ridge. 293 F.2d 585, 588 (7th
Cir. 1961); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96, 98 (6th Cir. 1947).
31 See the discussion of this problem by Justice Stone in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,
531 (1939) (concurring opinion).
32 E.g., Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 6 (5th Cir. 1958); Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153,
155 (6th Cir. 1956); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
825 (1947).
33 E g O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318? 324 (1914) ; Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119,
121 (6th bir. 1964); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1963);
Conrad v. Stitzel, 225 F. Supp. 244, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
34 E.g., Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962); Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F.
Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
35 Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1963); Smith v. Cremins,
308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962); Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.
Cal. 1964).
36 Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1958); Conrad v. Stitzel, 225 F. Supp. 244,
247 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
37 Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1964); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59,
63 (7th Cir. 1958). A related statute of limitations problem is whether the statute runs
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realistically be directed against any of these interpretations. Given the unique
nature of the statutory right created and the diversified state statutes of limitations,
consistent holdings should not be expected. The only alternative for future claimants,
aside from the prompt filing of lawsuits, lies in congressional action.
Section 1983 indicates that suits may be brought for constitutional violations
by the "party injured," who must be a "citizen" or "other person." The interpretation of the word "person" has presented a few, relatively academic, difficulties. A
good share of the discussion concerns the inclusion of artificial entities as "persons"
whose fundamental "rights" may have been deprived. Generally, corporations and
other artificial persons38 have been successful. In fact, the only consistently unsuccessful "person" has been the United States.3 9 Its desire to take effective action,
however, should be satisfied by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides for
suits at the instance of the Attorney General to protect
40 constitutional rights in the
areas of public education and public accommodations.
The problem of whether or not the cause of action created by section 1983
survives the death of the injured party has also posed some procedural difficulties,
again because Congress has not committed itself. Generally the claim has been held
to survive the death of the person whose rights have been infringed, 41 although
the reasons given have not been consistent. Some courts have refused to attribute to
Congress an intention to permit the vindication of lesser claims while withholding
relief at the deprivation of life itself. 42 Another court, in allowing survival, has
fallen back on the common law rule which permits the action to survive only when
a property right, as opposed to a personal right, has been affected.4 3 The latter
reasoning is clearly unsatisfactory in that it permits the personal representative of
the deceased to bring an action under section 1983 only if his death was completely unrelated to the depiivation which gave rise to the claim. The former view,
permitting the survival of those claims which arose from conduct resulting in death,
should be preferred, even in the face of the statutory language which refers only
to the "party injured."
One of the most persistent problems of our federal system involves the maintenance of a delicate balance in federal-state relationships. The federal judiciary,
as the final arbiter of the limits of federal power, has, of course, been deeply involved in this continuing effort. It is no'surprise that section 1983 has contributed
to the difficulty of assessing the proper role of the federal government in state
activities. A provision which demands protection of federally created rights from
state infringement is necessarily vulnerable to the judicial doctrines of abstention
and exhaustion of administrative remedies. 44 Prior to Monroe v. Pape the law was
clear that a person who sought relief in the federal courts under section 1983 to
against the § 1983 claim of a prison inmate. Compare Diaz v. Chatterton, 229 F. Supp. 19
(S.D. Cal. 1964) with Conrad v. Stitzel, 225 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
38 E.g., Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961); Brewer v. Hoxie
School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956); McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Los Angeles
County, 181 F.2d 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950). Contra, Dallas Independent School Dist. v. Edgar, 255 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1958).
39 E.g., United States v. Biloxi Municipal School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss.
1963), aft d, 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ.,
219 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1964).
40 78 Stat. 241 §§ 204(a), 407 (1964).
41 Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961);
Nelson v. Knox, 230 F.2d 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1956); Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572, 574
N.D. Ill. 1955). But cf., Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868
1961), (abatement of claim assumed).
42 Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961);
Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572, 574 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
43 Nelson v. Knox, 230 F.2d 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1956).
44 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939), had held that a claimant under § 1983
need not exhaust possible judicial remedies in a state before invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
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protect some constitutional guarantee against interference by state officials was
first required to exhaust whatever administrative channels were open to him in
the state.45 In addition, federal courts occasionally chose not to assume jurisdiction over section 1983 claims as a matter of discretion when'other highly sensitive
federal-state matters were at stake.' e In Monroe, however, the Supreme Court
stated: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not first be sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."' 7 This
assertion by the Court of the supplementary character of the remedy afforded by section 1983 was repeated two years. later in McNeese v. Board of Education."
The latter case involved a suit in equity for injunctive relief from de facto segregation in a public school. McNeese is significant in that the Court vaguely suggested a gray area in which federal courts may yet be permitted to refrain from
exercising their jurisdiction over section 1983 claims, namely, "where strands of
local law are woven into the case that is before the federal court."'49 The area
of permissible federal abstention has thus become quite restricted. Lower federal
courts have generally accepted the 51developments in Monroe and McNeese,s though
isolated abdications have occurred.
Section 1983: Immunity
The language of section 1983 clearly authorizes the bringing of claims for
violations of fundamental rights against "every person" who misuses some position of public trust. The development of the law in this area, however, has been
quite complex. Primarily responsible for the complexity are the doctrines of municipal and official immunity and the concept of action taken "under color of'
state law.
The doctrine of municipal immunity is one of long standing. It had been used
several times before Monroe v. Pape to defeat section 1983 damage claims against
municipalities.5 2 Thus the determination in Monroe that the City of Chicago was
immune from a civil damage claim was not a difficult one. The Court, however,
did place its basic reliance on the legislative history of section 1983 rather -than
upon any theory of municipal immunity.5 3 Lower federal courts have cited Monroe
while adhering to the principle of immunity. 5' The principle has been extended
45 E.g., Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 1958); People v. Bibb, 252 F.2d
217, 219 (7th Cir. 1958); Davis v. Am, 199 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1952). But cf., Bruce
v. Stilwell, 206 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1953) (state administrative agency clearly attempting
to act in excess of its authority).
46 Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701, 704 (Ist Cir. 1953) (state policy strongly opposed); Galfas v. City of Atlanta, 193 F.2d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1952) (to permit state courts
to interpret zoning ordinances); Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950)
(to avoid interruption of state proceedings).
47 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
48 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
49 Id. at 673. See generally, Note, 40 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 101 (1964).
50 E.g., Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964); Jordan v.
Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962);
Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
51 Chase v. McCain, 220 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Va. 1963); Armstrong v. Board of Edue.,.
220 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ala.), ret'd, 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963).
52 E.g., Cuiska v. City of Mansfield, 250 F.2d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 937 (1958); Cobb v. City of Maiden, 202 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir. 1953); Charlton v.
City of Hiahleah, 188 F.2d 421, 422 (5th Cir. 1951). But cf., Burt v. City of New York, 156
F.2d 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1946).
53 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188 (1961). The inclusion of municipal liabilityohad
been attempted, but had been ultimately rejected by the House of Representatives.
54 E.g., Fisher v. City of New York, 312 F.2d 890, 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
828 (1963) ; Wise v. City of Chicago, 308 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 944 (1963); Scolnick v. Winston, 219 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329
F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1964).
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to other municipal corporations.55 The fact that Monroe v. Pape involved a claim
for damages left open the question of whether the equitable relief afforded by
section 1983 was to be available in a suit against a municipality. Despite a contrary inference in a footnote to the Court's opinion in Monroe, 6 the Seventh Circuit subsequently argued that the doctrine of municipal immunity does not prevent the granting of an injunction against threatened actions of a city. In Adams v.
City of Park Ridge, '7 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of a discriminatory ordinance prohibiting charitable solicitations. The court first discussed the
rationale of immunity in the following terms:
The facts in Monroe v. Pape suggests [sic] several inherent reasons for
excluding municipalities from liability for damages, such as unauthorized
misconduct of the officers, lack of power of city to indemnify plaintiffs for
such misconduct, and a city's governmental immunity in the exercise of
its police powers, from liability
for injuries inflicted by policemen in the
performance of their duties. 58

It then found that such considerations were not persuasive when the question
involved the issuance of an injunction to restrain unconstitutional action. In the
following year, the Supreme Court itself, in Turner v. City of Memphis,59 directed
equitable relief under section 1983 against enforced segregation in a restaurant
held under a lease from the defendant. It did so without making any reference
to the doctrine of municipal immunity or Monroe v. Pape.
The doctrine of official immunity has undoubtedly gone farther toward limiting the effectiveness of section 1983 as a damage remedy than any single factor.
The doctrine stems from a considered policy of the common law that judges, legislators and other public officers should not be held responsible in damages for
wrongs committed by them while in pursuance of their respective duties. The Supreme Court has been confronted with a claim of official immunity in a suit for
damages under section 1983 only once. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 0° it held that the

Civil Rights Acts had not abrogated the traditional immunity of legislators from
civil liability. The federal courts have interpreted this holding as indicating a
general retention of common law official immunity. The immunity of judges is
the most deeply rooted. By the great weight of authority, judges, 61 officers of
the court,62 and indeed all persons connected with the judicial process6" are
55 Harvey v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1964) (school district); Sires v. Cole,
320 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1963) (state and county); Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 47,
48 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (township).
56 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191, n. 50 (1961). The Court referred to Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), and Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955),
vacating 223 F.2d 93 (1955), in which equitable relief against municipalities had been granted
under § 1983. It noted that the question had not been raised in those cases, and added: "Since
we hold that a municipal corporation is not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases."
57 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
58 Id. at 587.
59 369 U.S. 350, 354 (1962). Equitable relief against unconstitutional municipal action is
also available in certain circumstances under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-02 (1958), and under federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
60 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
61 E.g., Ray v. Huddleston, 327 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1964); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d
107, 108 (10th Cir. 1962); Larsen v. Gibson, 267 F.2d 386, 387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 848 (1959); Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, 240 (7th Cir. 1959); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d
782, 785 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809, 811 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 835 (1953), Contra, Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d Cir.
1945) (justice of the peace), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1957); McShane v. Moldovan, 172
F.2d 1016, 1022 (6th Cir. 1949) (justice of the peace).
62 E.g., Harmon v. Superior Court, 329 F.2d 154, 155 (9th Cir. 1964); Wise v. City of
Chicago, 308 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 944 (1963): Jennings v.
Nester, 217 F.2d 153, 154 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 958 (1955); Ellis v. Wissier,
229 F. Supp. 196, 198 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Contra, Johnson v. Crumlish, 224 F. Supp. 22, 24
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (quasi-judicial officials).
63 E.g., Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 718 (8th Cir. 1964); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d
868, 870 (9th Cir. 1964); Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1963) (court-
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immune from section 1983 damage suits in connection with their judicial functions. Occasionally the language of the traditional doctrine has been qualified to indicate that the immunity only attaches when the judge has at 6 least
4
colorable jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter under inquiry. In
the non-judicial areas, official immunity has been tempered somewhat, encompassing only the good faith discretionary acts of officials done within the scope
of their authority.65 In one recent case a blanket immunity was granted to all
public officials, although this may be explained by noting that the section 1983
claim was found to be spuriousA. °
As indicated above, the doctrine of official immunity is a common law principle which has been superimposed upon the early Civil Rights Acts. The invocation of this principle in- any given case represents a judgment between two competing considerations. As one court stated, these considerations are:
the protection of the individual citizen against damage caused by oppressive
or malicious action on the part of public officers, and the protection of
the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against the
suits
harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage
6
based on acts done in the exercise of their official responsibilities. 7

Since the policy in our law favoring immunity is so well established, only the lower
echelons of public servants are subjected to damage claims under section 1983 with
any consistent success. Public officials, however, are vulnerable to the equity powers
of the federal courts under section 1983.65 Indeed the flexibility provided by this
equity power probably represents the saving feature of the provision. The danger
of harassment of public officials is greatly diminished, and at the same time a
vehicle for the disposition of claims of unconstitutional acts ranging from flagrant
abuses to good faith infringement is maintained.
Section 1983: "Under Color of" State Law
Section 1983 requires that the "person" being sued must be one whose actions
were taken "under color of any statute, ordinance,. regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory," and an allegation to this effect is required.6 9 The language clearly excludes federal officials and other persons acting pursuant to federal statutes.7 0 Private persons are also excluded as a matter of course,71 although
this statement is made subject to later modification. The "person" required must
in an official capacity at the
not only be a public official, but he must
7 2 be acting
time the deprivation of rights takes place.
appointed physician); Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 938 (1960) (physician testifying in commitment proceeding).
64 E.g., Sarelas v. Sheehan, 326 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 S. Ct. 1334
(1964); Johnson v. MacCoy, 278 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1960); Ryan v. Scozgin, 245 F.2d 54
(10th Cir. 1957). In Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 209 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. Il.
1962), the court rejected a defense of judicial immunity. It asserted that judges are immune
only when in the exercise of judicial functions, and that "it is not a judicial function in this
State for a magistrate to direct a police officer to arrest and take into custody a person not
named in a warrant. . . ." The Yates decision was cited with approval in Luttrell v. Douglas,
220 F. Supp. 278, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
65 E.g., Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9th Cir. 1959); Nelson v. Knox, 256
F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1958).
66 Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20, 23-26 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
67 Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1964).
68 E.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323
F.2d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1963).
69 Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Mosley, 190 F.2d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 1951).
70 E.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963); Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d
581, 582 (9th Cir. 1964); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 1964).
71 E.g., Sarelas v. Forikos, 320 F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985
(1964) ; Cooper v. Wilson, 309 F.2d 153, 154 (6th Cir. '1962) ; Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288,
290 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956).
72 Watkins v. Oaklawn jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1950) (off-duty police
officers).
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It is important to remember that the interpretation of the language of section 1983 may not exceed the boundaries of "state action" outlined in the fourteenth amendment. However, the limits of "state action" have expanded considerably in recent years through the liberal efforts of the federal courts.7 The area
currently of special interest involves the problem of discrimination in places of
public accommodation.7 4 At issue is the degree to which such discrimination may
be said to constitute "state action" or action taken "under color of" state law.
The vanguard decision in this area, until quite recently, was Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.75 There it was held that the exclusion of a Negro from a restaurant operated by a private individual under a lease from a state agency constituted "state action" and a denial of equal protection within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment.76 The Court in Burton also expressed a hesitancy to further extend the doctrine.7 The fact remains, however, that the "state action" had
amounted to no more than an acquiescence in discriminatory practices occurring
on state property.
If a state law requires segregation in places of public gathering, unconstitutional "state action" is undoubtedly involved, and equitable relief is unquestionably appropriate. 78 But the question of whether a private person in such a situation, who complies with the segregation ordinance, may successfully be sued for
damages under section 1983 as having acted "under color of" state law is not
so clear. This question might have been confronted in Williams v. Hot Shoppes,
Inc!5 There the plaintiff, a Negro, alleged that he had been discriminated against by
a private restaurant manager because the latter felt compelled to do so by a
statute of Virginia requiring segregation in places of "public entertainment or public assemblage." The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia decided to abstain
from resolving the question, pending a determination by the Supreme Court of
Virginia of the applicability of the state segregation ordinance to restaurants. Two
judges dissented, indicating not only that the private restaurant owner would be
technically liable under section 1983 for segregation compelled by state law, but also
that the court should have considered and decided the plaintiff's claim that the
73 One of the most liberal of the many lower federal court decisions in recent years which
have tested the limits of the concept of "state action" and have not reached the Supreme Court
is Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12- (N.D. Il1. 1963).
There the district court found a discriminatory scheme instigated by the defendant labor union
against Negro applicants for membership. An injunction was granted admitting the Negro
plaintiffs to the union and apparently enjoining all future discrimination by the defendants
on the ground that certain federal and state agencies had passively acquiesced in the discrimination. Federal acquiescence was traced to the failure of its agencies adequately to police an
antidiscrimination clause in a government contract on which the union was working. The state
participation had consisted entirely in the permission granted by the Chicago Board of Education to the union for the use of its facilities as part of an apprenticeship training program.
The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court order, however, on the ground that since the
original complaint was directed solely toward enjoining further work on the government contract, and the contract had.terminated, the question was moot. Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship
Comm., 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
74 The discussion following assumes sufficient noncoverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
74 Stat. 241, § 201 (1964), governing facilities subject to the commerce power, to give continuing importance to the term "state action" in this area.
75 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
76 Id. at 724.
77 The Court stated:
[Rjespondents' prophecy of nigh universal application of a constitutional
precept so peculiarly dependent for its invocation upon appropriate facts
fails to take into account "Differences in circumstances [which] beget appropriate differences in law." Id. at 726.
78 E.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353 (1962); Baldwin v. Morgan, 287
F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961); Smith v. City of Birmingham, 226 F. Supp. 838, 841 (N.D.
Ala. 1963); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1, 8 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
79 293 F.2d 835.(D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925 (1962).
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actions of certain law enforcement officials amounted to a compulsion of the defendant to segregate his facilities.80
In 1963 the Supreme Court, in Lombard v. Louisiana,"' reversed the conviction of certain negro and white college students convicted of criminal mischief for staging a "sit-n' demonstration in a privately owned restaurant on the
grounds that highly publicized statements of New Orleans public officials, directig a continued policy of segregation in private restaurants, constituted "state
action" in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Shortly thereafter, in Williams
v. Howard Johnson's, Inc.,8 2 the Fourth Circuit remanded a section 1983 damage claim for a further hearing on the question of state involvement in Virginia segregation practices. However, no further disposition has resulted.
Thus no apparent resolution has been made of the precise question of the liability of a private person in a case wherein he was "compelled" to act by state
law. 3 The injustice of holding such a person liable for damages under section 1983
is more apparent than real. A private person will seldom be forced to choose between becoming a defendant in a state criminal action for violation of its segregation laws, where the defense of unconstitutionality of the law is clearly available,
and becoming a defendant in a civil suit for damages under section 1983 in a federal court. To the degree that state compulsion might actually exist, however,
the federal courts will find themselves in a difficult situation. In such a case they
might easily sympathize with the defendant, 4 recalling perhaps the felt impropriety of assessing damages against a public official whose good faith conduct nevertheless results in some constitutional deprivation. The dissenters in Williams v. Hot
Shoppes, Inc.,85 anticipating this difficulty, made the following comments:
[Iln the last twenty years the expansion of the state action concept and
of the area of rights protected by the Federal Government have made this
section an increasingly flexible vehicle for enforcing the Constitution's
guarantees of individual liberties against encroachment by the states and
their representatives. The relief provisions of the statute are strikingly adaptable for that purpose. The present case demonstrates this. If, in fact, appellee's refusal to serve appellant was compelled against his will, principles
of equity combine with the purpose of the Act to dictate relief which would
also shield appellee against such compulsion, 6rather than penalize appellee
by imposing demages for surrendering to it.8

Another aspect of action taken "under color of" state law should be considered. The Court in Monroe, following the Classic and Screws decisions, held that
a municipal officer may be acting "under color of" state law though in direct contravention of state statute. Justice Frankfurter dissented on this point and urged
a re-evaluation of these precedents on the ground that they had not accurately
reflected the legislative history of the criminal counterpart of section 1983.87 The
Court's decision on this point, however, has not been seriously questioned. Most
courts have either assumed the existence of the principle or summarily deferred to
80 Id. at 843 (dissenting opinion).
81 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
82 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963).
83 But cf., Flemming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 224 F.2d. 752, 753 (4th
Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956). There the court held that a § 1983
damage suit was proper against a bus company whose driver was made a police officer by state
statute for the purpose of enforcing a segregation policy on public carriers.
84 Harrison v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D. Del. 1962), suggests that a distinction
should be made between the phrases "state action" and action taken "under color of" state
law. The court indicated that state-conipelled discrimination may constitute "state action"
but not action taken "under color of" state law on the part of the person compelled to discriminate. In practice such a distinction would require a refusal to grant any relief under
§ 1983. while permitting equitable relief under general federal question jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), based upon the fourteenth amendment violation.
85 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925 (1962).
86 Id. at 847.
87 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 220 (1961) (dissenting opinion). See generally,
Alfange, "Under Color of Law": Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 395 (1961-62).
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it. 8 An interpretation that would have precluded relief when the action of the
state officials was in violation of state law would have greatly minimized the effectiveness of section 1983. The need for relief of the variety afforded by section
1983 is, after all, greatest in those instances in which the states are reluctant to
discipline law enforcement officers for conduct violative of due process guarantees. If section 1983 were confined solely to authorized activity on the part of the
public official involved, relief would seldom be granted, since public officers normally operate under a shield of immunity for good faith execution of duty.
Section 1983: Requisite Intention of the Actor
The most significant and controversial statement made by the Supreme Court
in Monroe v. Pape in its interpretation of section 1983 may well turn out to be
that made in reference to the requisite intention of the actor. Since the word
"wilfully," found in the criminal provision which was interpreted in the Classic and
Screws cases, s9 does not appear in section 1983, the Court concluded that a specific
intent to deprive the plaintiff of a right protected by the fourteenth amendment
was not necessary. It said that since section 1983 is a civil provision, it "should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions."9' 0 Justice Frankfurter added that "allegations that respondents in fact did the acts which constituted violations of constitutional rights are sufficient."9 Because the thrust of these statements came
somewhat unexpectedly, 92 considerable room has been left for speculation. Where
comment has been offered by the lower federal courts thus far, it has consistently
indicated an unwillingness to accept this language of the Supreme Court at face
93
value.
The Seventh Circuit, in Hardwick v. Hurley,9 appeared somewhat disgruntled
by the tort liability language in Monroe. It declared that these words could be
taken to mean that the intention of the actor is totally irrelevant, as well it might
be. Then, most unrealistically, the court declared: "However, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court intended to go to the extent, for instance, of saying that an officer who struck a prisoner in self defense was, in some way, violating the constitutional rights of the prisoner." 95 Of course it did not, for self defense does not under any circumstances amount to a constitutional deprivation,
and a constitutional deprivation must be established, whatever the intention of the
actor. The Supreme Court, perhaps unwittingly, but fairly understood, has indicated that the officer need only do the act which amounts to a denial of some
constitutional safeguard. The intention of the actor is only relevant insofar as a
natural likelihood exists, if indeed it does, that a constitutional deprivation will be
accompanied by malicious conduct.
Although chiding the Hardwick court, the Ninth Circuit failed to produce a
much more palatable interpretation of the "natural consequences" statement in
88 See, e.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d
24 (9th Cir. 1962); Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Selico v. Jackson,
201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
89 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
90 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
91 Id. at 208 (dissenting opinion).
92 Prior to Monroe, good faith on the part of the actor was apparently a defense to a §
1983 claim for damages. Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 707 (1st Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951). In fact, in Francis
v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 587 (1st Cir. 1954), Judge Magruder suggested that if the broad
language of § 1983 were interpreted literally, Congress would be shocked into passing amendatory legislation.
93 The only decision which has taken the language regarding the mental disposition of the
actor at face value is Johnson v. Crumlish, 224 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
94 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961).
95 Id. at 530-31.

NOTES
Monroe. In Cohen v. Norris,96 it suggested that "there may well be defenses, such
as self defense and unforeseeability due to defects in a warrant, or by reason of
other circumstances" which could be made in the answer to a complaint-97 Certainly "self defense" is a good defense to a section 1983 damage claim, for, as
suggested earlier, in such a case no constitutional deprivation can be proved. But
defects in a warrant can hardly be considered "unforeseeable" in modem tort
parlance. Permitting the actor to escape liability in these situations is really no
more than a recognition of good faith conduct, and good faith conduct as a defense is difficult to square with the "natural consequences" language of Monroe.
Ultimately, then, the Ninth Circuit had stated only the obvious proposition previously mentioned, that is, that the complaint need not allege a specific purpose
on the part of the defendant to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right.
A statement made in Selico v. Jackson may give some insight into the general refusal of the lower federal courts to give full sway to the "tort liability"
approach. In that case, the plaintiff's claim clearly contained allegations which,
if established, would entitle him to relief under section 1983. He alleged facts
tending to establish an arrest without a warrant and without probable cause, and
a wrongful detention accompanied by a beating at the hands of Los Angeles police officers. The district court dismissed a contention by the defendants that the
complaint was defective in failing to allege a specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of some constitutional right, citing the language of Monroe v. Pape presently
under consideration. But it then added:
The court is cognizant of the fact that not every case involving a
wrongful arrest gives rise to a federal right of action against the arresting
officers and that state police officials must be protected from tort actions
based upon honest99 misunderstandings of statutory authority and mere

errors of judgment.
Apparently by way of demonstrating that its approach was well founded, the
court concluded with a statement discussing the traditional immunity of public
officials from civil suit based upon acts undertaken within the scope of their authority.
A somewhat different approach was takei recently in Campbell v. Glenwood
Hills Hospital, Inc., 00 but the problem of the requisite intention of the actor was
again treated without clarification. The plaintiff sued the superintendent and the
attending physician of a private hospital to which he had been committed by order
of the probate court. The constitutional infringements alleged were a denial of the
right to seek counsel and a withholding of the notice of a probate court hearing.
The court based its dismissal on the ground that the defendants were not acting
"under color of" state law. It added the further argument, however, that even
if they were assumed to be acting "under color of" state law, the superintendent
and physician would not be liable. The court's argument was based on the "tort
liability" language of Monroe v. Pape. It reasoned:
An essential element in tort liability is the breach of a legal duty owed by
the wrongdoer to the injured party. Consequently, to recover under these
statutes it is implicit that the alleged deprivation of civil rights must result
from a breach of a duty owed by the wrongdoer, and the duty must be one
possessed by virtue of state law.10 '

The latter statement is not entirely correct. It
tion of civil rights must result from a breach
tiff by the defendant, but it is not true that
by virtue of state law. The authority by virtue
take action must have come to him from the
96
97
98
99
100
101

300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 29.
201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
Id. at 478.
224 F. Supp. 27 (D. Min. 1963).
Id. at 32.

may well be true that the deprivaof a legal duty owed to the plainthe duty must have been possessed
of which the defendant was able to
state. Thus it is said that a person
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can become liable under section 1983 only while acting in an official capacity. But
the duty the defendant breaches when he deprives another of a constitutional right
is imposed upon him by the fourteenth amendment and made actionable by section 1983, not by state law. A private physician ordinarily cannot be sued under
section 1983 because the fourteenth amendment imposes no legal duty upon one
who does not carry the badge of state authority.
Thus the court in Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hospital, Inc., used the language
of Monroe most relevant to determining the requisite intention of the actor to support its conclusion that the defendants were not acting "under color of" state law.
Such usage can only add to the primary problem posed in the clarification of this
language. The problem involves limiting the broad language of Monroe in ordef
to exclude public officials from liability for good faith conduct. 10 2 The Supreme
Court may well "clarify" its previous holding with this problem in mind. It could
do this by pointing out that it was only necessary to the decision in Monroe to say
that a specific intention to deprive a person of some constitutional guarantee need
not be alleged or proven. Alternatively, the Court might take the suggestion of the
dissenters in Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc. 10 3 and affirm the peculiar adaptability
of section 1983 to individual cases. Either nominal damages for vindication of the
constitutional right or a restriction to equitable relief would be an acceptable compromise in many instances.
Section 1983: Due Process and Equal Protection
Section 1983 purports to remedy only deprivations of "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Taken in
the context of the fourteenth amendment, this means that only those interferences
by public officers which reach the level of denials of due process and equal protection, or deprivations of the "privileges and immunities" of citizens can be redressed.' 04 The words "privileges and immunities" of citizens have never retained
much significance. This is in great part due to the restricted application given
them in The Slaughterhouse Cases.05 Monroe v. Pape, however, reasserted the
principle that the elusive fourteenth amendment concept of due process of law was
within the coverage of section 1983.108 This of course meant that the continued
expansion of the fourteenth amendment to encompass fundamental freedoms of
the first eight amendments, previously protected only against action by the federal
government, would be reflected in increased litigation under section 1983. This reflection was quickly forthcoming. The Supreme Court applied the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Robinson v. California.0 7 The Court held invalid
a state law which punished the "status" of narcotics addiction as a crime. In
102 Many other decisions have suggested a refusal to apply the tort liability language in
Monroe literally. E.g., Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 1963); Beauregard v.
Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 183 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
103 293 F.2d 835, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925
(1962).
104 For "abusese falling short of constitutional deprivations see Tabor v. Hardwick, 224
F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956) (prisoner does not have absolute right to file civil action); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 884 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 915 (1953) (wrongful revocation of driver's license).
105 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). But see, Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 139 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947) (federal jury service a "privilege" secured by federal law);
Zellner v. Lingo, 218 F. Supp. 513, 515 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (free passage between states a
"privilege" of national citizenship).
106 Denials of due process had, of course, been recognized as being subject to § 1983 claims
before Monroe. E.g., Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) (illegal search, unlawful
arrest and detention); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953) (coerced confession); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953) (procedural
due process in license revocation).
107 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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United States ex rel. Hancock v. Pate,08 a prisoner in a state penitentiary sought
injunctive relief against his warden, alleging that to be deprived of eligibility for
parole for a year and a half for having acted in self defense during a prison scuffle constituted a cruel and unusual punishment. This allegation was held sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, in Colon v. Grieco,10 9 a motion
by the defendant police officer for summary judgment on a section 1983 complaint
for damages was granted partially on the ground that the sixth amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial, which had been extended to include prompt commitment
before a magistrate, had not been made applicable ¢o the states by the fourteenth
amendment.
Another interesting example of the reflection on section 1983 of the expansion
of the concept of due process is provided by York v. Story.110 There the plaintiff
brought an action under section 1983 against certain Chico, California, police officers. She claimed that certain unnecessary and unconsented photographs were
taken of her nude body in connection with an assault charge she had filed. The
purpose of the photographic exhibits was allegedly to evidence certain nonexistent
bruises. These photos were later copied and distributed to various members of the
Chico police department. The Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed
a dismissal of the complaint. It held that the plaintiff had successfully stated a
claim for deprivation of the guarantees of freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure and invasion of privacy within the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment."'
Nor have recent developments in section 1983 litigation ignored the equal
protection area of the fourteenth amendment. In Marshall v. Sawyer,"'2 the plaintiff alleged discriminatory treatment at the hands of a conspiracy headed by the
Governor of Nevada, the members of the Gaming Control Board and Gaming
Commission of Nevada, and certain private individuals associated with the Desert
Inn Hotel in Las Vegas. He alleged that through the efforts of the named public
officials a "black book" containing the names of certain "undesirables," including
himself, was circulated among Nevada casino operators. He further alleged that the
private operators were urged to refuse to permit the plaintiff to patronize their
establishments. The district court relied on the doctrine of abstention in dismissing
the complaint for damages and injunctive relief under section 1983. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the doctrine of abstention was inapplicable since the
constitutionality of a state statute was not involved .2 3 The court added, significantly, that the plaintiff had successfully stated a claim for relief based upon a denial
of equal protection, at least as to the named public officials."'
Further amplification of the concept of equal protection was made in Butler v.
Crumlish.125 There the plaintiffs were being held in custody at the Philadelphia
Detention Center while awaiting trial on various criminal charges. They resisted
police attempts to place them in a "line-up" with their fellow inmates. The prisoners
alleged that they had remained in custody solely because of an inability to furnish
bail. They further alleged that since other accused persons who had been able to
108 223 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
109 226 F. Supp. 414, 420 (D. N.J. 1964).
110 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
111 Id. at 456. It has also been held that the due process clause guarantees penitentiary
inmates "reasonable accesW" to the courts. Stiltner v. Rhay, 332 F.2d 314. 316 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964) ; United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Prasse, 225 F. Supp. 752,
754 (E.D. Pa. 1963). But in Stein v. Oshinsky, 224 F. Supp. 757, 760 (E.D. N.Y. 1963), a
mandatory injunction was granted permitting the voluntary recitation of a prayer in a public
school on the ground that such recitation did not tend toward the establishment of a religion by
the state within the meaning of the first amendment.,
112 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
113 Id. at 645.
114 Id. at 647.
115 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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furnish bail were not subjected to police "line-ups," the plaintiffs were being denied
the equal protection of the laws. The district court granted the prisoners' request
for a temporary injunction." 6
Any discussion of section 1983 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment would be incomplete without at least passing reference to the school
desegregation and reapportionment decisions. Since Brown v. Board of Education"7
and Baker v. Carr,1 8 literally hundreds of similar suits for equitable relief have
been filed, the great percentage of which claim violations of section 1983 and invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts under section 1343 (3).219
Section 1983: Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
As was suggested earlier, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
prompted this re-evaluation of section 1983, a provision derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. A brief comparison of these legislative efforts leads to the
conclusion that their respective operations will be more complementary than contradictory. The Act of 1964, first of all, was not intended as a replacement. It
specifically provides that existing remedies relating to the protection of individual
rights are to continue in effect.

20

The 1964 effort was instead directed at the, failure

of existing civil rights laws, including section 1983, to deal adequately with the
problem of private discrimination, particularly in the areas of public services 21
and employment opportunities. 122 The new Act also seeks to strengthen existing
civil rights laws dealing with voting, 2 3 and to speed up the process of desegregation in the public schools. 24 The implementation of the Act of 1964 in the latter
areas will no doubt diminish the utility of section 1983 somewhat by providing an
alternate remedy for abuses. But it is submitted that a broad basis of effective
operation for section 1983 will remain.
It is important to point out that the direction of the public accommodations
and employment opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is quite
different from that of section 1983. The former provisions, drawing upon the commerce power, are projected at action by private individuals which has a certain
relationship to interstate commerce. Section 1983, limited by the "state action"
concept drawn from the fourteenth amendment, is directed only toward conduct
of those persons who in some way may be said to be acting pursuant to state authority.
For example, the public accommodations section of the 1964 Act would reach private
discrimination practiced by motel owners, which discrimination is normally
outside the purview of section 1983. It would not, however, reach the discriminatory
treatment of prison inmates by the warden of a state penitentiary. The latter conduct
remains within the exclusive province of section 1983.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 1983 may also be distinguished by
the nature of the interests they seek to protect. The Act of 1964 is designed to
insure that equality of treatment will .be afforded to all persons in certain defined
areas. More specifically stated, it is directed at redressing all instances of racial
discrimination occurring, for example, in places of public accommodation, schools,
116 Id. at 567. In another somewhat novel decision, an allegation-that school officials had
refused the plaintiff permission to use public school buildings for certain functions while granting similar permission to others was held sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 for
a denial of equal protection. Lee v. Hodges, 321 F.2d 480, 486 (4th Cir. 1963).
117 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
119 Among the most recent are Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn.
1964); Stout v. Hendricks, 228 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Ind. 1964); Blocker v. Board of Educ.,
226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. N.Y. 1964).
120 78 Stat. 241 §§ 207(b), 303, 409 (1964).
121 78 Stat. 241, §§ 201-07 (1964).
122 78 Stat. 241, §§ 701-16 (1964).
123 78 Stat. 241, § 101 (1964).
124 78 Stat. 241, §§ 401-10 (1964).

NOTES
labor unions, and voter registration booths. On the other hand, section 1983 covers
a much greater spectrum of interests. It is aimed not only at denials of equal
protection, but also at deprivations, through the conduct of public officials, of any
and all rights which individuals are guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 1983, for example, may effectively
prevent a registrar of voters from requiring a higher standard of accomplishment
of colored applicants than is required of white applicants. But only section 1983
is available to redress the injury of a person who is denied a proper hearing on a
liquor license application,'2 5 or who is thrown in jail for an extended period without
formal charges being
filed, 126 or who is refused the right to express his views on
2
religious matters.
Finally, the relief afforded by the two measures under discussion is also distinguishable. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for equitable relief from discriminatory treatment at suit of the person aggrieved or the Attorney General. 28
It does not provide a civil damage remedy, as does section 1983. As has been pointed
out, the damage provisions of section 1983 have been considerably restricted by the
doctrine of official immunity. Even so, the possibility of recovering civil and
punitive damages in limited cases of malicious conduct by public officials remains.
Should the occasion arise wherein both section 1983 and some portion of the new
Act are applicable to a given instance of malicious discrimination, the former section
would provide a very desirable alternative to the injured party.
Conclusion
The history of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 parallels the history
of the fourteenth amendment, which it was enacted to implement. The recent
expansion and development of both is characteristic of our legal system. Section
1983 has certainly progressed far beyond the limits which might have been envisioned in the post-Civil War years. The decision of the Supreme Court in Monroe
v. Pape has tested, and future decisions will continue to test,.the outer limits of due
process and equal protection. Certain areas of conflict in the interpretation of
section 1983 remain, however, involving important considerations of public policy.
These areas of conflict include the possible further amplification of the phrase
"under color of" state law, the doctrine of immunity of public officials, and the
intention required of the actor to constitute a violation of section 1983. The germane
policy considerations revolve around grass-roots attitudes toward public officials
and conceptions of federal-state relationships. No manner of resolution of these
problems, however, nor the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is likely to
return section 1983 to any approximation of its prior insignificance. The remedy
is firmly entrenched, and awaits further development.
Frank J. Walz
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